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I. INTRODUCTION
With the appointments of Associate Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh,
it is increasingly likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will either overrule Roe
v. Wade' or apply the "undue burden" test from Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey2 in a less robust fashion. In either scenario, legislators who oppose abor-
tion would have more leeway to restrict abortion. This Article analyzes a
particularly controversial form of regulation, which ultimately may be re-
viewed by the United States Supreme Court. At least ten states have enacted
laws prohibiting abortion when it is requested because of the sex, race, or
disability of the fetus. A federal Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act has also
been proposed.' Legislators regularly use the discourse of equality to pro-
mote these laws, describing them as "anti-eugenic" measures to address the
problem of discriminatory abortions.
In 2018, the Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction against Indiana's
statute, which prohibits a doctor from performing an abortion if the woman
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1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, GUTTMACHER
INST. (April. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-
sex-or-race-selection-or-genetic-anomaly (noting where enforcement has been temporarily or
permanently enjoined by court order); in addition to the eight states listed on the chart, in
2019 Utah enacted a law prohibiting abortion when requested due to Down Syndrome and
Kentucky enacted a law prohibiting abortion when sought due to the race, sex, national origin,
or disability of the fetus. See Lindsay Whitehurst, Utah Legislature Passes Down Syndrome
Abortion Ban, AP NEWS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.ap-
news.com/2e6e85b3a63042e9ad387ddaed6d58d6; Bruce Schreiner, Federal Judge Blocks
Second Kentucky Abortion Law in Days, AP NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019), https://ap-
news.com/624elOaf299b4b8f9c7eel5ddadl4cO9.
4. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2017, H.R.147, 115th Congress
(2017), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/ll 5th-congress/house-bill/147.
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seeks the procedure solely because of the sex, race, or disability of the fetus.5
However, four judges in the Seventh Circuit praised the statute and expressed
their hope that the Supreme Court would hear the case.6 Indiana filed its
Petition for Certiorari on October 12, 2018, less than one week after Justice
Kavanaugh's confirmation.7 Eighteen other states and the governor of Mis-
sissippi joined an amici brief supporting the Petition.8 Indiana urged the
Court to hear the case, arguing that "the stakes are too high" to await further
judgments in the lower courts.' Indiana also insisted that the Court could
uphold the statute without overruling Roe or Casey because the issue of "dis-
criminatory" abortion was not expressly considered in either case.i0
On May 28, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision on Indiana's
Petition, which some commentators have described as an "apparent compro-
mise."1 In a per curiam opinion, the Court upheld a statutory requirement
that abortion providers bury or cremate fetal remains but denied the remain-
der of Indiana's Petition, expressing no views on the constitutionality of laws
that prohibit abortions motivated by the sex, race, or disability of the fetus.12
The Court observed that it was following its normal practice of denying a
Petition when only one Court of Appeals has addressed the issue.13 How-
ever, Justice Thomas wrote a lengthy concurring opinion defending Indi-
ana's statute, insisting that "this law and other laws like it promote a State's
compelling interest in preventing abortion from becoming a tool of modern-
day eugenics."'4 While agreeing with his colleagues that it was appropriate
5. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. St. Dep't of Health, 888
F.3d 300, 305-307 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding injunction against Ind. Code §16-34-4-4-16-
34-4-8; the court also upheld an injunction against provisions requiring fetal remains to be
cremated or buried, which are not discussed in this article).
6. Id. at 310-317 (Manion, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. St. Dep't of Health, 917 F.3d 532,
536-538 (7th Cir. 2018) (vacating decision of en banc review due to lack of majority) (Easter-
brook, J., joined by Sykes, Barrett, and Brennan, JJ. dissenting from the denial of en bane
review).
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Comm'r of the Ind. St. Dep't of Health v. Planned
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d 300 (No. 18-483) [hereinafter Petition].
8. See Brief of the States of Wisconsin, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Governor Phil Bryant of the State of Mississippi as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Comm'r of Ind. St. Dep't of Health v. Planned
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d 300 (No. 18-483) [hereinafter Brief of States Sup-
porting Indiana].
9. Petition, supra note 7, at 22.
10. Id at 26-30.
11. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Sidesteps Abortion in Ruling on Indiana Law, N.Y.
TIMES (May 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/us/politics/supreme-court-
abortion-indiana.html.
12. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (per curiam).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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to await further percolation in the lower courts, Justice Thomas predicted
that the Court would soon have to confront the constitutionality of this type
of regulation. " Indeed, a similar case is already pending in the Sixth Circuit,
where Ohio has appealed an injunction against a statute prohibiting doctors
from performing an abortion when a pregnant woman is even partly moti-
vated by a fetal indication of Down syndrome.'6 If that case generates a con-
flict between circuits then the Supreme Court will almost certainly have to ad-
dress it. The outcome could have profound effects on a woman's right to
access abortion services.
Part II of this Article reviews the origins of this form of regulation and
the role of "anti-eugenics" rhetoric in promoting it. This section of the arti-
cle acknowledges that selective abortion is a painful subject, particularly for
the disability rights movement. The medical profession should recognize an
ethical duty not to promote disability-selective abortion when offering pre-
natal screening. But I also argue that the term "eugenic" should be reserved
for state-sponsored laws and policies that seek to control reproduction and
should not be used to describe an individual woman's decision to terminate
a pregnancy.
Part III of the Article turns to the constitutional debate and demonstrates
that Indiana's statute and laws similar to it could not be upheld without over-
ruling the longstanding precedent established in Roe and refined in Casey.
Contrary to what has been argued by Justice Thomas and certain judges in
the Seventh Circuit, there is no reason to believe that the Justices who de-
cided Roe and Casey were thinking only of those women who became preg-
nant accidentally. The text and context of the judgements demonstrate that
the Justices were considering all women who seek abortions, including those
who may have initially welcomed a pregnancy.
Part IV of the Article concludes by suggesting that legislators could
adopt far less coercive measures to discourage sex-selective and disability-
selective abortions. Although the United States has a significant body of
anti-discrimination legislation, funding is grossly inadequate for inclusive
education, which is essential for families rearing children with disabilities.
The United States Senate should also ratify the Convention on the
15. Id. at 4.
16. Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2018), appeal pend-
ing, No. 18-3329 (6 " Cir. April 12, 2018) (the District Court granted a preliminary injunction
against Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.10(B), which prohibits any person from performing an abor-
tion if the person has knowledge that the woman is seeking the abortion, in whole or in part,
because of a test result indicating Down syndrome; a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome;
or any other reason to believe that the fetus has Down syndrome). For commentary on the
statute, see Marc Spindelman, On the Constitutionality of Ohio's "Down Svndrone
Abortion Ban, " 79 OHIO ST. L. J. FURTHERMORE 19 (2018).
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") 7
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD")."
The monitoring bodies for these two treaties have also wrestled with the is-
sue of selective abortion and have joined forces to address the systemic
causes while also protecting women's right to reproductive autonomy.
II. EQUALITY AND ANTI-EUGENICS: THE NEW DISCOURSE OF THE ANTI-
ABORTION MOVEMENT
The discourse of equality first entered the debate on abortion through
the lens of gender equality. Steven Mosher, a leader in the anti-abortion
movement, claimed that immigrants from Asia were bringing sex-selective
abortion to the United States and that this phenomena could be exploited to
help weaken support for abortion generally.19 Mosher argued that the issue
would "force supporters of abortion to publicly address a question that they
will find profoundly disturbing: is the right to an abortion a license to destroy
children for any and all reasons, including that of their sex?"2 0 He predicted
that feminists would defend abortion "with less conviction" when confronted
by laws prohibiting sex-selective abortion.2 1 Gradually, this strategy broad-
ened to also include bans on abortion on the basis of the race or disability of
the fetus.22
Mosher's strategy does not appear to have dampened feminist support
for reproductive freedom. This may be because sex-selective abortion is far
less common in the United States than portrayed by Mosher2 3 making it eas-
ier for pro-choice organizations to dismiss his articles as cynical tactics ra-
ther than a genuine effort to promote equality.2 4 Indeed, it has been pointed
17. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
adopted by G.A. and opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into
force Sept. 3. 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
18. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by G.A. Dec. 13,
2006, 2515 U.N.T. S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008) [hereinafter CRPD].
19. Steven W. Mosher, President's Page: Let Us Ban Sex-Selective Abortions,




22. See generally Justin Gillette, Pregnant and Prejudiced: The Constitutionality of
Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88 WASH. L. REv. 645, 646 (2013); Carole J.
Petersen, Reproductive Justice, Public Policy, andAbortion on the Basis ofFetal Impairment:
Lessons from International Human Rights Law and the Potential Impact of the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 28 J. OF L. & HEALTH 121 (2015).
23. See Brian Citro et a]., Replacing Myths with Facts: Sex-Selective Abortion Laws in
the United States, CORNELL L. FAC. PUBL'N., Paper 1399, 7 (2014).
24. Race and Sex Selective Abortion Bans: Wolves in Sheep's Clothing, NAT'L ASIAN
PAC. AM. WOMEN'S FORUM, https://www.napawforg/uploads/1/1/4/9/114909119/prendais-
suebriefI 1.26-final.pdf (last updated July 2013).
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out that laws prohibiting sex-selective abortion may tend to undermine
equality by reinforcing racist stereotypes regarding Asian-Americans.25
Nonetheless, the idea of prohibiting selective abortion has found some
support within the disability rights community, creating an unusual alliance
between anti-abortion activists (who tend to be politically conservative) and
certain disability rights advocates (who tend to be politically liberal).26 This
alliance is understandable given the history of eugenics, which provided the
inspiration for many restrictions on reproduction by persons with disabilities.
The word "eugenic" (derived from the Greek word for "well born") was orig-
inally coined by Francis Galton, one the founders of the English Eugenics
Education Society. Eugenics is a social philosophy that openly advocated
for controlled breeding as a way to improve the quality of the population.2 8
While many people associate eugenics with the racist ideology of Nazi Ger-
many, eugenic theories have been influential in many countries and were
commonly used to justify sterilization of persons with disabilities.2 9 In 1927,
the Supreme Court upheld Virginia's sterilization law with Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes famously proclaiming, "[t]hree generations of imbeciles
are enough."3 0 It was not until 1942 that the right to reproduce was recog-
nized as a fundamental right in American constitutional law."
More recently, Roe and the concept of reproductive freedom have been
relied upon to assert a woman's right not to be sterilized or coerced into hav-
ing an abortion.3 2 Ironically, however, opponents of abortion have begun to
accuse women who exercise that freedom as practicing "private eugenics"
when they terminate a pregnancy due to some characteristic of the fetus.33
In my view, this is an inappropriate use of the term "eugenics," which should
be reserved for restrictions on reproduction imposed upon individuals by the
25. See A Win Against Racist, Sex-Selective Abortion Bans, NAT'L AsIAN-PAC. AM.
WOMEN'S FORUM, https://forwomen.org/grants-2/meet-our-grantees/grantee-profile-na-
tional-asian-pacific-american-womens-forum/ (last visited April 18, 2019); Jennifer M.
Denbow, Abortion as Genocide: Race, Agency, and Nation in Prenatal Nondiscrimination
Bans, 41 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 603, 603-626 (2016).
26. Stefanija Giric, Strange Bedfellows: Anti-Abortion and Disability Rights Advocacy,
3 J. OF L. & THE BIOSCIENCES 736, 736-742 (2016).
27. Ruth Hubbard, Abortion and Disability: Who Should and Who Should Not Inhabit
the World?, THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 74, 75 (4th ed. 2013).
28. See generally Frank Dikotter, Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History
ofEugenics, 103 AM. HiST. REv. 467 (1998).
29. See Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Provid-
ing Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 862, 862-63 (2004).
30. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 20 (1927).
31. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
32. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859
(1992).
33. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Pro-Life Legal Defense Fund et al. Supporting
Petitioners, at 12, Comm'r of Ind. St. Dep't of Health v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky.,
Inc., 888 F.3d 300 (No. 18-483).
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state or some other powerful institution. When an individual woman decides
to terminate her own pregnancy, she weighs intensely personal factors and
does not base her decision on some grand plan for improving the quality of
the population.34
Those who use the term "eugenics" in the context of abortion are argu-
ably on more solid ground when they examine the role of the medical pro-
fession, particularly in the era of expanded prenatal testing. Previously, in-
vasive diagnostic tests-such as amniocentesis and chorionic villus
sampling-were required to identify genetic anomalies. It is now possible
to isolate cell-free fetal DNA in the mother's plasma, providing a reliable
method of detecting chromosomal anomalies without the risk of miscar-
riage." As a result, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists ("ACOG") recommends that all pregnant women be offered prenatal
diagnostic screening and testing, regardless of maternal age or other risk fac-
tors. The ACOG's official position is that it only recommends screening
be offered and that it is entirely up to the patient whether to accept screen-
ing. 7 However, from the perspective of many disability rights activists, even
offering screening implicitly devalues the lives of persons with disabilities.3 8
Although genetic counselors may try to be neutral and emphasize patient
autonomy, there is always the risk that eugenic views will be conveyed to
prospective parents.3 9 As there is no treatment for chromosomal anomalies,
women will likely assume the reason screening is offered is to allow for an
early abortion if a genetic condition is revealed; this is borne out by the
34. See generally RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL
IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA (1999) (includes extensive interviews chronicling the
experiences of women, including those who refused prenatal testing and those who received
a diagnosis of fetal impairment and struggled with the decision as to whether to continue the
pregnancy).
35. Vardit Ravitsky, The Shifting Landscape ofPrenatal Testing: Between Reproductive
Autonomy and Public Health, 47 JusT REPRODUCTION: REIMAGINING AUTONOMY IN REPROD.
MED. S34 (2017).
36. Mark W. Leach, ACOG Issues New Prenatal Testing Guidelines, PRENATAL
INFORMATION RESEARCH CONSORTIUM (April 29, 2016), https://prenatalinfor-
mation.org/2016/04/29/acog-issues-new-prenatal-testing-guidelines/.
37. See Giric, supra note 26 (discussing a statement issued by the ACOG following
release of its 2007 guidelines).
38. Janet E. Lord, Screened Out of Existence: The Convention on the Rights ofPersons
with Disabilities and Selective Screening Policies, 12 INT'L J. DISABILITY, CMTY., & REHAB.
(2013); see also Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictorv or
Compatible?, 30 FLA ST. U. L. REv. 315, 315-16 (2003).
39. See Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, THE DISABILITY
STUDIES READER 87, 93 (4th ed. 2013) (noting that pregnant women may feel that it is their
duty to save society's resources by having an abortion after prenatal testing reveals a fetal
impairment).
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statistics.4 0 For example, recent studies of Down syndrome, one of the most
frequently occurring genetic conditions,41 report a termination rate between
67% and 85% in the United States.42 Some women have also reported that
they felt a certain Fressure to abort after they were given test results revealing
Down syndrome. The media also tends to portray disability in a fairly neg-
ative light and often presents the decision to abort in situations of fetal im-
pairment as "a matter of fact issue, with little regard to the controversy that
might be embedded in such a position."4 4
It is therefore important to develop ethical and policy-based standards
to ensure that prenatal screening and testing programs do not send, intention-
ally or unintentionally, offensive eugenic messages.4 5 If testing indicates a
likely fetal impairment, then the pregnant woman should have an opportunity
to consult with individuals and families living with a particular condition
regarding the challenges and opportunities of living with a particular impair-
ment. It is also important for feminists to work together with disability rights
advocates to ensure that "pro-choice" campaigns do not encourage disabil-
ity-selective abortions or assume that this will be the "choice" made by
women when they receive a diagnosis of fetal impairment.4 6
On the other hand, it is also important that the discourse of disability
rights not be used to pressure women or to deny them access to information.
There are some signs of this in the United Kingdom, where a campaign en-
titled "Don't Screen Us Out" was launched to argue against public funding
for prenatal testing on the basis that approximately 90% of British women
who receive a diagnosis of Down syndrome would elect to terminate their
pregnancies.4 7 An international network known as "Saving Downs" has also
been established to lobby for changes to screening programs.4 8 Saving
40. See Kenneth B. Schechtman et al., Decision-Making for Termination of Pregnan-
cies with Fetal Anomalies: Analysis of 53, 000 Pregnancies, 99 OBSTETRICs & GYNECOLOGY
216, 216 (2002).
41. See Jaime L. Natoli et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: A Systematic
Review of Termination Rates (1995-2011), 32 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 142, 142 (2012).
42. Id. at 152.
43. Alison Piepmeier, The Inadequacy of "Choice:" Disability and What's Wrong with
Feminist Framings of Reproduction, 39 FEMINIST STUD. 159, 168-176, 175 (2013) (discuss-
ing interviews with women who decided not to abort despite indications of Down syndrome).
44. Carol Bishop Mills & Elina Erzikova, Prenatal Testing, Disability, and Termina-
tion: An Examination ofNewspaper Framing, 32 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2012).
45. See, e.g., Ravitsky, supra note 35.
46. There is evidence that the reproductive rights movement is making that effort. See,
e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RTs., SHIFTING THE FRAME ON DISABILITY RIGHTS FOR THE U.S
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (March 2017), https://www.reproduc-
tiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Disability-Briefing-Paper-
FINAL.pdf.
47. Harms to Babies with Down's Syndrome & the Down's Syndrome Community,
DON'T SCREEN US OUT, http://dontscreenusout.org/ (last visited April19, 2019).
48. About Us: Our Mission and What We do, SAVE DOwN SYNDROME,
https://www.savedownsyndrome.com/aboutus (last visited April 19, 2019).
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Downs contends that prenatal tests must "respect the life and integrity of the
unborn child, cause no harm, be only directed towards safeguarding or heal-
ing the unborn child and be presented in a way that does not discriminate
against people with Down syndrome."49 Similarly, some advocates in the
United States believe that doctors should be required to communicate a pos-
itive view of what it is like to rear a child with Down syndrome.5 0 These
campaigns are problematic, both for the doctor-patient relationship and for a
woman's right to receive full and unbiased information. A woman's right to
receive full and unbiased information is particularly important when testing
reveals a fetal impairment that could cause significant physical pain or lead
to an early death. 1
In any event, in the midst of this highly contentious debate, it is not
surprising that the anti-abortion movement would use the spectrum of "eu-
genic abortion" to justify new restrictions or that certain disability rights or-
ganizations would support these laws.5 2 The next section of the Article thus
turns to Indiana's argument that its statute is a "qualitatively new" type of
regulation, which could be upheld without overruling Roe or Casey.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT AND THE FUTURE OF ROE AND
CASEY
Justice Anthony Kennedy's retirement in 2018 renewed the debate on
the future of abortion in U.S. constitutional law. He provided the deciding
vote in Casey, which was, at the time, widely perceived as saving Roe from
being overruled. More recently, Justice Kennedy voted with the majority in
Whole Women 's Health v. Hellerstedt, which held that state regulations that
are ostensibly enacted to protect women's health need to offer tangible ben-
efits sufficient to justify the additional burdens they place on women seeking
abortions.54
Some politicians have predicted that Roe will be overturned now that
Justice Brett Kavanaugh has replaced Justice Kennedy. However, other
49. Id.
50. See Giric, supra note 26, at 740 (critiquing Pennsylvania's law Down Syndrome
Prenatal Education Act, which was passed in 2014 at the request of a father of a child with
Down syndrome who thought that abortions of fetuses at risk of having Down syndrome re-
flected a lack of positive information on what it is like to raise a child with the condition).
51. Ellen Painter Dollar, Why Prenatal Screening for Gender and for Disabilities are
Not the Same, PATHEOS (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/ellenpainterdol-
lar/2012/01/why-prenatal-screening-for-gender-and-for-disabilities-are-not-the-same/.
52. See Brief for Foundation Jerome Lejeune et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, Ind. St. Dep't ofHealth v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d 300 (No.
18-483).
53. Petition, supra note 7, at 14.
54. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318-2321 (2016).
55. See, e.g. Michael Burke, Cuomo: Kavanaugh, Gorsuch are "going to reverse Roe
v. Wade, " THE HILL, (Jan. 7, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/424192-cuomo-
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commentators believe that Chief Justice John Roberts will be reluctant to
overrule such a longstanding precedent and that the Court will instead "chip
away" at the right to abortion by upholding a wider range of state regula-
tions.56 This is what makes statutes prohibiting "discriminatory" abortion so
interesting-proponents have argued that it would not be necessary to over-
rule Roe or Casey in order to uphold the regulation. This section of the
Article analyzes that argument, which received support from certain judges
in the Seventh Circuit and also from Justice Thomas' recent concurring opin-
ion.
The relevant provisions in Indiana's statute would have prohibited abor-
tions at any time, including prior to viability, if the doctor knows that the
pregnant woman is seeking an abortion: (1) solely because of the sex of
the fetus;59 or (2) solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down
syndrome or has a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome, or has been diag-
nosed or has a potential diagnosis of "any other disability," with exceptions
for disabilities that will, with reasonable certainty, result in death within three
months of birth; 60 or (3) solely because of the race, color, national origin, or
ancestry of the fetus.61
When these provisions were challenged by Planned Parenthood in
Planned Parenthood ofIndiana v. Commissioner, the District Court granted
a motion for summary judgment and entered an injunction.62 On appeal,
Indiana argued that the statute could be reconciled with Casey because Casey,
only reaffirmed a woman's right to make a binary choice of whether or not
to have a child and not the right to terminate a particular pregnancy.6 3 The
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, citing the holding from Casey that "a
State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to ter-
minate her pregnancy before viability."6 4 However, Judge Manion wrote a
kavanaugh-gorsuch-are-going-to-reverse-roe-v-wade (quoting New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo).
56. Li Zhou, 10 Legal Experts on the Future ofRoe v. Wade after Kennedy, Vox (July
2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/7/2/17515154/kennedy-retirement-roe-wade.
57. Petition, supra note 7, at 26-30.
58. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (Thomas, J.
concurring).
59. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-34-4-4, 16-34-4-5 (LexisNexis 2019).
60. Id. at §§ 16-34-4-6, 16-34-4-7 (LexisNexis 2019).
61. Id. at § 16-34-4-8 (LexisNexis 2019).
62. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. St. Dep't of Health, 265 F.
Supp. 3d 859, 873 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
63. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., v. Comm'r of Ind. St. Dep't of Health 888
F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated, 917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part,
judgment rev'd in part sub nom; Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct.
1780 (2019) (noting that Indiana "creatively suggests that Casey only reaffirmed a woman's
'binary choice' of whether or not to have a child prior to viability").
64. Id at 305 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (emphasis added by the 7 " Cir.).
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lengthy separate opinion, arguing that Indiana's theory of a binary right
"makes sense" and invited the Supreme Court to take the case.5 Judge Man-
ion also complained that the right to have a pre-viability abortion had, in his
opinion, evolved into a "super-right" with an effects test that is more difficult
to satisfy than strict scrutiny.6 6 He further opined that Indiana's law could
survive strict scrutiny because the nondiscrimination provisions were "nar-
rowly tailored to target invidious discrimination" and that Indiana had a com-
pelling interest in attempting to prevent this type of "private eugenics."67
Judge Manion concluded that the case "begs for the Supreme Court to recon-
sider Roe and Casey" or, in the alternative, to "downgrade abortion to the
same status as actual constitutional rights" so that states could justify re-
strictions by demonstrating a compelling need to prevent discriminatory
abortions.8
Indiana then requested en banc review in the Seventh Circuit (with re-
spect to the provisions relating to disposition of fetal remains), which was
denied.6 9 What is striking, however, is the separate dissenting opinion of
Judge Easterbrook, which was joined by three additional judges in the Sev-
enth Circuit. Although Indiana had not even requested en banc review of the
nondiscrimination provisions, Judge Easterbrook took the opportunity to dis-
pute the panel's conclusion that Casey required the court to uphold the in-
junction. He wrote:
Casey and other decisions hold that, until a fetus is viable, a woman is
entitled to decide whether to bear a child. But there is a difference be-
tween "I don't want to bear a child" and "I want a child but only a male"
or "I want only children whose genes predict success in life." Using
abortion to promote eugenic goals is morally and prudentially debatable
on grounds different from those that underlay the statutes Casey decided.
None of the Court's abortion decisions holds that states are powerless to
prevent abortions designed to choose the sex, race, and other attributes of
children ... We ought not to impute to the Justices decisions they have
not made about problems they have not faced.70
Judge Easterbrook's opinion featured prominently in Indiana's Petition
for Certiorari. The Petition described the nondiscrimination provisions as
representing "a qualitatively new type of abortion statute that responds to
new technological developments allowing women to make a choice not
65. Id. at 310-321 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id at 311.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 313.
69. The vote, which was initially in favor of en banc review, became tied after the
recusal of one judge and the petition was therefore denied. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. &
Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. St. Dep't of Health, 917 F.3d 532, 536-538 (7th Cir. 2018).
70. Id. at 536-538 (Easterbrook, J.,joined by Sykes, Barrett, and Brennan, JJ. dissenting
from the denial of en banc review).
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contemplated at the time of [Roe or Casey]: the choice of which child to
bear."7 1 Indiana insisted that this type of regulation "neither implicates the
concerns underlying Roe and Casey nor burdens the right those cases ulti-
mately protect."72 Rather, the Petition argued, the statute was intended to
regulate "women who have already made the decision 'to bear or beget a
child' but simply do not want to bear a particular child."7 ' The amici brief
submitted by the 18 states supporting Indiana also quoted liberally from
Judge Easterbrook's dissenting opinion.74
Similarly, in the Sixth Circuit, attorneys for Ohio have relied upon Jus-
tice Easterbrook's dissent in their appeal of a preliminary injunction against
a statute that prohibits abortion if the woman's decision is due to a fetal in-
dication of Down syndrome. During oral arguments before the Sixth Circuit,
Ohio's attorneys acknowledged that overturning the injunction would create
a conflict with the Seventh Circuit and they urged the judges to go ahead and
create that conflict.7 5 A conflict between circuits would, of course, increase
the likelihood of the Supreme Court eventually reviewing the constitutional-
ity of this type of statute.
The question then is whether a majority of the Supreme Court would
accept the argument made by Indiana and Ohio. In my view it could not do
so without either overruling or greatly limiting the precedents set in Roe and
Casey. It is simply not credible to argue that the Justices who decided Roe
were thinking only of women who accidentally become pregnant. The judg-
ment in Roe contains a detailed comparative discussion of abortion law and
the reforms that were gradually being adopted in various jurisdictions. The
author of the opinion, Justice Harry Blackman, had researched both the med-
ical and legal history of abortion and was clearly aware of the trends in law
reform. At that time, proponents of reforms often cited the risk of fetal
impairments-whether due to genetic anomalies, rubella infection, or expo-
sure to certain drugs-as one of the reasons why a woman might decide to
seek an abortion.77 Indeed, the judgment expressly mentions statutes that
provided exceptions for this situation. For example, the judgment quotes
from a British statute adopted in 1967, which permitted abortion where two
doctors certified that, "there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it
would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
71. Petition, supra note 7, at 14.
72. Id. at 29-30.
73. Id. at 30.
74. Brief of States Supporting Indiana, supra note 8, at 11-15.
75. Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 7016 (6th Cir. March 7, 2019)
(No. 18-3329) (argument heard on January 30, 2019), http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/in-
ternet/courtaudio/aud .php.
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
77. Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017 UTAH L. REv. 587, 593
(2017).
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handicapped."78 The Court also cited Section 230.3 of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code,7 9 and the Uniform Abortion Act, which had
been drafted and approved by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1972."o Both of these model statutes categorized a "substantial
risk" that the child would be born with a "grave physical or mental defect"
as one of the situations in which abortion would be permitted."' As a result,
by the time Roe was decided, a number of states allowed women to obtain
an abortion in cases of fetal impairment, albeit often with onerous procedural
requirements.82 Indeed, Georgia's statute-which was declared unconstitu-
tional in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe-fell in that category
because it permitted abortion when a doctor determined that the fetus was
likely to be born with a "grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or phys-
ical defect."83 The Supreme Court considered this statute carefully and de-
clared it unconstitutional, finding that the procedural hurdles were unduly
restrictive of women's constitutional rights.4
In light of this history, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court was
aware that some women were seeking abortions due to a fear of a fetal im-
pairment. Neither the opinion in Roe or Doe v. Bolton addressed this cate-
gory of women separately from women who simply did not want to be preg-
nant, rendering the opinions consistent with the Court's ultimate conclusion:
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is firmly rooted
in the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy. Thus, a state does not have
the right to pass judgment on a woman's reasons for seeking an abortion in
the early stages of pregnancy. This is the key difference between the U.S.
constitutional framework and legal systems that require a woman to demon-
strate that her reasons fall within a statutory exception to a general ban on
abortion.5
Two decades later, in Casey, the Court recognized that Roe's trimester
framework was problematic but expressly reaffirmed what it described as
the essential holding from Roe: the "right of a woman to choose to have an
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 137-138 (citing Abortion Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2 c.
87 (Eng.)).
79. Id. at 140.
80. Id at 146.
81. Id. at note 40; MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
82. See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT
SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING 272 (2012) (describ-
ing the American Law Institute's model statute and noting that a majority of Americans then
supported abortion in situations of "grave physical or mental defect" of the fetus).
83. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 183 (1973).
84. Id at 195-202 (describing procedural hurdles, including the need for two other doc-
tors to concur in the first doctor's finding and for approval by a hospital committee).
85. See Carole J. Petersen, Reproduction and Family Planning: Individual Right or Public
Policy?, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY, 261-305 (Raymond
Wacks, ed., Hong Kong University Press, 1993) (contrasting the legal framework of Hong Kong,
the United States, and selected European nations).
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abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the
State."8 6 States may take steps to ensure that the decision is "thoughtful and
informed" and so a requirement that a doctor obtain a woman's consent at
least 24 hours before the procedure was upheld.17 States may also enact reg-
ulations designed to inform women that "there are procedures and institu-
tions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of
state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself."" But Casey
was exceedingly clear that a state may not prohibit any woman from making
the ultimate decision on whether to abort a pregnancy before viability. 89 it
is important to note that by this time in the early 1990s, the Court had con-
sidered additional cases in which the issue of fetal disability had been raised
and thus the Justices were clearly aware that this could be the motivation for
seeking an abortion.90
It is also clear that the Justices in Casey had thought about the relation-
ship between eugenics and reproductive freedom. In explaining their deci-
sion to uphold Roe, the Justices observed:
If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear and beget a
child had not been recognized as in Roe the State might as readily restrict
a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it,
to further asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for
example. Yet Roe has been sensibly relied upon to counter any such sug-
gestions. E.g., Arnold v. Board of Education of Escambia County,
Ala., 880 F.2d 305, 311 (CAl 11989) (relying upon Roe and concluding
that government officials violate the Constitution by coercing a minor to
have an abortion); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 115 (CA4
1981) (county agency inducing teenage girl to undergo unwanted sterili-
zation on the basis of misrepresentation that she had sickle cell trait).91
The decision to cite to these cases demonstrates that the Court viewed
a woman's constitutional right to privacy as providing protection against eu-
genic policies. It would be a huge leap for the Court to accept Indiana's
argument that a woman practices a form of eugenics when she exercises her
right to privacy and decides to terminate her pregnancy for personal reasons.
Indiana made one additional argument in support of its claim that the
statute does not violate Case--that a ban on discriminatory abortion is




89. Id. at 879.
90. See e.g. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 389 note 8 (1979) (discussing evidence
that medical technology makes it possible to detect whether a fetus has a disorder); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 340 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that federal funding was
unavailable even when it was known that the fetus would suffer an early death if carried to
term).
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 859.
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comparable to a ban on partial birth abortion, which was upheld in Gonzalez
v. Carhart.92 Of course, the two statutes are quite different: Gonzales in-
volved a federal statute banning a particular method of abortion93 whereas
Indiana's statute purported to ban abortion when it is sought for particular
reasons. The Petition for Certiorari suggested that the two cases are analo-
gous because Indiana's statute also "does not attempt to replace viability
with some other temporal re-definition of the right not 'to bear or beget a
child."' Instead, the Indiana statute purported to ban abortion based on an-
cillary overriding justifications not expressly considered in Roe or Casey,
just like the ban on partial-birth abortion upheld in Gonzales.9 4 Amici briefs
submitted in support of Indiana also relied upon Gonzales. In essence, this
line of argument invited the Court to hold that the viability line recognized
in Casey need not be applied when the state is asserting an interest other than
the potential life of a particular fetus. As one amici brief argued, "the Court
could uphold a prohibition on the eugenic practice of Down syndrome dis-
crimination abortion without disturbing the general rule of viability set out
in Roe and Casey."95
If the Court were to accept this theory, then it might conceivably recog-
nize that different state interests-such as an interest in protecting persons
living with disabilities from receiving the message that they are unworthy of
life or an interest in preventing the elimination of certain classes of people-
are both "compelling" and exempt from the viability line because they can
only be pursued by a law prohibiting certain abortions from the moment of
conception.
While these are creative arguments, in my view it would not be possible
to uphold Indiana's statute without overruling Casey.9 6 Even if the Court
were to accept that the viability rule need not be applied to a statute prohib-
iting "discriminatory" abortion, it would still have to acknowledge that it is
an enormous restriction on a woman's personal liberty to insist that she carry
a pre-viability pregnancy to term in order to help a state fulfill certain broad
social goals. It is one thing to tell an employer or an educational institution
that it cannot treat persons differently based on sex, race, or disability-an
analogy that proponents of Indiana's law often try to make-but it is quite
92. Gonzales v. Carhart. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
93. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
94. Petition, supra note 7, at 29.
95. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Susan B. Anthony List in Support of Petitioners,
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comn'r of Ind. St. Dep't of Health, 917 F.3d 532
(7th Cir. 2018) (although the Susan B. Anthony list opposes abortion generally, it has devoted
this brief to what it refers to as "the eugenic practice of Down Syndrome discrimination abor-
tion").
96. See Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal Anom-
alv?: Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of Prenatal
Whole Genome Sequencing, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291 (2013) (analyzing why a proposed
federal law prohibiting disability-selective abortion would also be unconstitutional).
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another to insist that a woman must give birth to a particular fetus in order
to support a state's goal of equality. As observed in Casey, a woman who
carries a pregnancy to term is subject to anxieties, physical constraints, and
pain that only she must bear.97 This is even more true if the pregnant woman
knows that her future child will have an impairment-perhaps one that will
cause great suffering or death in early childhood.98 Laws prohibiting pre-
viability abortions-which is what Indiana and numerous states that support
it seek to enforce-would thus put the liberty of a pregnant woman at stake
in a sense that is "unique to the human condition."99 Indeed, one might argue
that it would be "eugenic" for the state of Indiana to require individual
women to lend their wombs to the state in order to advance its purported
state interest in promoting equality and respect for persons with disabilities.
The impact of this coercion would, of course, fall disproportionately on low-
income women because women with assets can travel to states with more
liberal laws to obtain abortions.
Moreover, as demonstrated in the final section of the Article, there are
far less coercive means of achieving the state interests that have been as-
serted by Indiana.
IV. PROMOTING EQUALITY WITHOUT COERCION
The World Health Organization and other international agencies have
long agreed that the most effective way to discourage sex-selective abortion
is to remedy sex discrimination, which is the underlying cause of male pref-
erence within families.00 Similarly, disability rights advocates recognize the
overriding importance of removing barriers and reducing discrimination,
thus making the prospect of parenting a child with a disability less daunting.
In recent decades, the United States has enacted a body of legislation to
promote the rights of persons with disabilities, including the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") 101 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
97. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992) (plurality opinion).
98. The only exception to Indiana's ban on disability-based abortions was for disabili-
ties that would, with reasonable medical certainty, result in death within three months of birth;
thus it sought to require the woman to carry a pregnancy to term even when the fetus has a
genetic disorder that will cause death in early childhood. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16-34-4-1(b), 35-
46-5-3(a) (West 2016).
99. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
100. WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., PREVENTING GENDER-BIASED SEX SELECTION: AN
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 10 (2011),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Is-
sues/Women/WRGS/PreventingGenderBiasedSexSelection.pdf (recommending systemic
changes to reduce son preference but also cautioning that efforts to manage or limit sex se-
lection should also not hamper or limit access to safe abortion services).
101. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (amended 2009)
(the ADA was amended by the Americans with Disability Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
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Act ("IDEA").1 02 The IDEA legislation is particularly important because it
theoretically guarantees a "free appropriate education" in the most inclusive
environment possible, putting an end to an era when children with disabili-
ties were routinely segregated and given little meaningful education.10 3
However, it is well known that inclusive education-still referred to as "spe-
cial education" in the United States-is grossly underfunded.10 4 As a result,
many parents of children with disabilities feel compelled to litigate in order
to secure the education to which their children are entitled.0 5 Parents also
worry about whether a child with an impainnent will be able to obtain em-
ployment and live independently as an adult."6 Given the high rate of un-
employment among persons with disabilities, this is a very understandable
concern. 107 Publicity regarding these concerns and other examples of disa-
bility discrimination naturally increase a prospective parent's apprehension
and therefore encourages disability-selective abortion.0 As such, the fed-
eral and state governments need to increase funding for inclusive education
and work to expand employment opportunities for persons with disabilities.
It is also time for the United States to ratify both CEDAW and the
CRPD. Although the enforcement processes for human rights treaties are
notoriously soft, both treaties could provide advocacy tools for those seeking
better funding and implementation of the laws prohibiting discrimination.
The United States signed the CRPD in 2009, during the administration of
President Obama, and came very close to ratifying the treaty in 2012.'09 The
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009) and 29
U.S.C. § 705 (2009))).
102. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C § 1400 et seq. (2004).
103. See generally, Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handi-
capped Act: A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349,
364-66 (1990).
104. See, e.g. National Council on Disability, Broken Promises: The Underfunding of
IDEA (Feb. 7, 2018).
105. Id. at 35-36 (reporting an increase in complaints from parents regarding the failure
to provide children with disabilities with a free appropriate education in an inclusive environ-
ment); Christopher Thomas Leahy & Michael A. Mugmon, Allocation of the Burden ofProof
in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Due Process Challenges, 29 VERMONT L. REV.
951 (2009) (analyzing the difficulties parents face when filing complaints on behalf of their
children).
106. Chris Kardish, Hidden or Unemployed: America's Failure to Get Disabled People
Jobs, GOVERNING (June 2015), https://www.goveming.com/topics/mgmt/gov-american-disa-
bilities-act-compliance.html.
107. See, e.g. BROOKINGS INST., People with Disabilities are Disproportionately Among
the Out-of-Work, THE AVENUE (June 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-ave-
nue/2017/06/30/people-with-disabilities-are-disproportionately-among-the-out-of-work/.
108. See Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 846, 863 (2009).
109. For discussion of the failure of the United States to ratify the treaty in 2012, see
Carole J. Petersen, The Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities: Using Interna-
tional Law to Promote Social and Economic Development in the Asia Pacific, 35 U. HAw. L.
REv. 821 (2013).
620
Summer 2019] CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES
ratification effort was truly bipartisan (led by Senators John McCain and
John Kerry) and could be revived if a few more Republican Senators would
agree to support it.
The overall purpose of the CRPD is to "promote, protect and ensure the
full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by
all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dig-
nity."o10 CRPD also marks a "paradigm shift" because it rejects the outdated
medical and social welfare models of disability and embraces the social
model, which emphasizes the right to make one's own decisions and fully
participate in society."' Yet, the treaty also acknowledges that some persons
living with impairments require significant services and support in order to
live with dignity.'12 The CRPD therefore takes a holistic approach to rights
and rejects the traditional dichotomy between civil liberties and economic,
social, and cultural rights."'
Further, the CRPD is relevant to the issue of disability-selective abor-
tion. The issue came up during the drafting of several provisions in the
treaty, including Article 10 (right to life), Article 23 (condemning state-spon-
sored sterilization), and Article 25 (equal access to sexual and reproductive
health services).14 The travaux preparatoire reveal a vigorous debate on
the wording of these provisions.'15 The Holy See (which participated but
ultimately decided not to sign the treaty) objected to references to "sexual
and reproductive health" services, arguing that they could be interpreted to
include abortion services.'16 In order to address this objection and other con-
cerns regarding disability-selective abortion, a working group submitted a
proposal for defining the "right to life.""17 The proposed text stated that
"[d]isability is not a justification for the termination of life" and that States
110. CRPD, supra note 18, at art. 1.
111. See Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge ofthe United Nations Convention
on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 287 (2007); Rose-
mary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness Into Light? Introducing the Convention on
the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, 8 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 1 (2008).
112. See, e.g. Theresia Degener, Disability in a Human Rights Context, in DISABILITY
HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 2018 (Dr. Anna Arstein-Kerslake ed., 2018); Michael Ashley Stein, Dis-
ability Human Rights, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 75 (2007).
113. Fred6ric M6gret, The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Concept of
Rights, 12(2) INT'L J. OF HUM. RTs. 261 (2008).
114. CRPD, supra note 18, at arts. 10, 23, 25.
115. See Mi Yeon Kim, Women with Disabilities, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY
ADVOCACY 113, 123 (Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze, eds., 2014); Marta Schaaf, Ne-
gotiating Sexuality in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 SUR. INT'L
J. HUM. RTs. 113, 113(2011).
116. Schaaf, supra note 115, at 123. For further discussion of the Holy See's position on
international instruments that address reproductive rights, see Chad Marzen, The Holy See's
Worldwide Role and International Human Rights: Solely Symbolic?, 27 U. DET. MERCY L.
REv. 659 (2009).
117. Lex Grandia, Imagine: To Be a Part of This, in HuM. RTS. AND DISABILITY
ADVOCACY 146, 152 (Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze, eds., 2014).
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Parties to the treaty "shall undertake effective measures to the prohibition of
compulsory abortion at the instance of the State based on the prenatal diag-
nosis of disability."" 8 However, this language proved controversial because
none of the previous United Nations ("UN") human rights treaties have en-
dowed the fetus with rights.'19 Ultimately, the drafters of the CRPD agreed
that Article 10 would simply protect the right to life and not refer to the un-
born or state that life begins at conception. 120
The drafters of the CRPD also considered whether it was possible to
create at least a minimal duty for governments to encourage prospective par-
ents not to terminate a pregnancy because of disability.121 A coalition of
Australian disability rights groups made the following suggestion:
This [issue] obviously presents a difficult ethical challenge, not least be-
cause of its potential impact on the choice of women in relation to preg-
nancy. However, it might be possible to address this issue more indi-
rectly. For example, much of the information that is made available to
parents at the time of genetic testing and immediately following the birth
of a child with disability is overwhelmingly negative and inaccurate, and
induces parents to opt for termination of pregnancy or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatments. It is possible to impose an obligation on States to
ensure that prospective parents of a child with disability receive positive
and realistic orientation to their child and its future life. This may reduce
the chances that parents will opt for tennination of pregnancy. 122
This language is comparable to what some disability rights organiza-
tions, such as Saving Downs, are advocating for at the domestic level. How-
ever, the idea of imposing an obligation on governments to give prospective
parents a positive view of what it would be like to rear a child with a disabil-
ity also proved controversial and as such, the proposal was abandoned.123
Nevertheless, the drafters did retain the language relating to the right of
persons with disabilities to access reproductive health services.'2 4 The right
to decide on the number and spacing of children was first stated in Article
16 of CEDAW and also appears in the CRPD.125 However, the language in
118. Id.
119. See generally Rhonda Copelon et al., Human Rights Begin at Birth: International
Law and the Claim ofFetal Rights, 13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 120, 122 (2005).
120. Grandia, supra note 117.
121. U.N. Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, Fourth Session of the Ad
Hoc Committee, Daily Summary of Discussions Related to Article 8: Right to Life, (Aug. 25,
2004) [hereinafter Right to Life Discussion], http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ena-
ble/rights/ahc4sumart08.htm.
122. U.N. Convention on the Rights ofPeople with Disabilities, Proposals and Amend-
ments Submitted Electronically, Fourth Session Comments by People with Disability
Australia (2006), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstatal1fscomments.htm.
123. See Right to Life Discussion, supra note 121.
124. CRPD, supra note 18, at art. 25.
125. Id. at art. 23.
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the CRPD is stronger because it provides that governments should ensure
that "[tihe rights of persons with disabilities to decide freely and responsibly
on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to age-appro-
priate information, reproductive and family planning education are recog-
nized, and the means necessary to enable them to exercise these rights are
provided."1 26 This provision was considered a breakthrough because persons
with disabilities are too often assumed to be sexually passive with no inti-
mate relationships. In fact, many persons with disabilities are sexually active
and want the ability to control their fertility.1 27
The CRPD has now been in force for 10 years and the issue of disabil-
ity-selective abortion has resurfaced, primarily when the Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities has reviewed government reports. For
example, Spain-the second country to be reviewed by the Committee-was
asked to explain why the legal period for abortion was longer in cases of fetal
impairment. Not receiving a satisfactory answer, the Committee included
the following, somewhat cryptic, statement in its Concluding Observations
on Spain's Initial Report:
The Committee takes note of Act 2/2010 of 3 March 2010 on sexual and
reproductive health, which decriminalizes voluntary termination of preg-
nancy, allows pregnancy to be terminated up to 14 weeks and includes
two specific cases in which the time limits for abortion are extended if
the foetus has a disability: until [twenty-two] weeks of gestation, pro-
vided there is "a risk of serious anomalies in the foetus", and beyond
week [twenty-two] when, inter alia, "an extremely serious and incurable
illness is detected in the foetus". The Committee also notes the explana-
tions provided by the State party for maintaining this distinction. The
Committee recommends that the State party abolish the distinction made
in Act 2/2010 in the period allowed under law within which a pregnancy
can be terminated based solely on disability.' 28
The following year, the Committee made similar comments on Hun-
gary's Initial Report.12 9 However, in some ways, the Committee's comments
to the Hungarian government were even stronger because it expressly
126. Id. at art. 23(l)(b) (in contrast, the CEDAW treaty only provides (at art. 16) that
women should have equal rights with men to determine the number and spacing of their chil-
dren).
127. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION & UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND,
PROMOTING SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 7 (2009);
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, All His Sexless Patients: Persons with Mental Disabil-
ities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 258 (2014).
128. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations of
the Committee on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities Spain, Sept. 19-23, 2011, U.N. Doc.
CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, 6th Sess., TT 17-18.
129. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations on
the Initial Periodic Report of Hungary, Sept. 17-28, 2012, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/HUN/CO/I,
8th Sess.,T 1.
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categorized a law permitting abortions in cases of fetal impairment as a form
of discrimination.'3 o The Committee expressed concern that Hungary's law
allows abortion "for a wider circle than in general for the fetuses deemed to
have health damage or some disability, thereby discriminating on the basis
of disability."131
The Committee's comments set off alarm bells among pro-choice
feminists, who feared that conservative governments would use the Commit-
tee's views as an excuse to restrict access to abortion. In 2013, the Center
for Reproductive Rights ("CRR") submitted commentary to the Committee
as part of its "half-day discussion" on women and girls with disabilities. 3 2
The CRR pointed out that the Committee's comments to Spain and Hungary
could undermine efforts by the other UN human rights treaty bodies to per-
suade governments to liberalize abortion laws and reduce the incidence of
illegal and unsafe abortions, which contribute to maternal mortality.
Subsequent events in Spain demonstrate that the CRR had good reason
to be concerned. In 2013, the government, led by the conservative Popular
Party, proposed to enact a bill prohibiting abortion in most circumstances,
including cases of fetal impairment.'3 4 Had the bill been enacted, the bill
would have reversed prior law reform and reinstated one of the most signif-
icant restrictions on abortion in Europe.'3 ' The refusal to include an excep-
tion for cases of fetal impairment-which appeared to be a response to the
Committee's comments-was particularly controversial and generated op-
position even among members of the ruling party.13 6 In the end, massive
opposition compelled the Spanish government o withdraw the proposed leg-
islation.37
The apparent reaction of the Spanish government to its recommenda-
tions, together with commentary from feminists, appears to have caused the
130. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
13 1. Id.
132. Center for Reproductive Rights: Submission to the Committee on the Rights ofPer-
sons with Disabilities, Half Day of General Discussion on Women with Disabilities, OFFICE
OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HuM. RTs.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGD2013.aspx (accessed by clicking
submission 24).
133. Id. at 9.
134. Petersen, supra note 22, at 155-158 (providing analysis of the Spanish govern-
ment's proposal).
135. Ashifa Kassam, Thousands of Pro-Abortion Protesters Gather in Spain, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/01/thousands-pro-
abortion-protesters-spain-madrid.
136. Guy Hedgecoe, Spain's Abortion Legislation 'ChangedAfter Protests', IRISH TIMES
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Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to reconsider the rela-
tionship between disability rights and access to abortion. Although the Com-
mittee continues to condenm situations in which women are pressured to
have an abortion, it has clarified that it also does not support laws that would
force a woman to carry a pregnancy to term. For example, in 2017, the Com-
mittee critiqued the British law of abortion, stating:
[t]he Committee is concerned about perceptions in society that stigmatize
persons with disabilities as living a life of less value than that of others
and about he termination of pregnancy at any stage on the basis of fetal
impairment. The Committee recommends that the State party amend its
abortion law accordingly. Women's rights to reproductive and sexual
autonomy should be respected without legalizing selective abortion on
the ground of fetal deficiency.138
Implicitly, the Committee was calling upon the British government to
give women the right to terminate a pregnancy without having to rely upon
certain "exceptions" in the law that tend to devalue persons with disabilities
and to repeal the unequal time limits, which currently allow much later abor-
tions in cases of fetal impairment.139 While this recommendation is some-
what nuanced, it would be hard for a government to interpret it as endorse-
ment for criminalizing abortion.
This position became even more clear in the summer of 2018, when the
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities issued a Joint State-
ment with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women.14 0 The statement emphasized that: "[a]cess to safe and legal abor-
tion ... are essential aspects of women's reproductive health and a pre-req-
uisite for safeguarding their human rights to life, health, equality before the
law, non-discrimination, information, privacy, bodily integrity, and freedom
from torture and ill treatment."1 41 Thus, governments "should decriminalize
abortion in all circumstances and legalize it in a manner that fully respects
the autonomy of women, including women with disabilities."l4 2 This state-
ment makes clear that the two Committees do not believe the phenomena of
sex-selective and disability-selective abortion should be used to justify co-
ercing women to carry pregnancies to term. Rather, governments should
138. Concluding Observations on Initial Report of the UK, paras. 12-13, U.N. Doc.
CRPD/C/GRB/CO/1 (2017).
139. Id. For additional analysis of British law, see THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY,
PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO ABORTION ON THE GROUNDS OF DISABILITY
(2013), available at https://dontscreenusout.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Abortion-and-
Disability-Report- 17-7-13.pdf.
140. Joint Statement, Comm. on the Rts. of Persons with Disabilities & Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Guaranteeing Sexual and Reproductive
Health and Rights for all Women, in Particular Women with Disabilities (Aug. 29, 2018),
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address "the root causes of discrimination against women and persons with
disabilities" and provide "support to parents of children with disabilities."1 4 3
The two Committees recommend repealing abortion laws that "perpet-
uate deep rooted stereotypes and stigma," which is almost certainly a refer-
ence to laws that make it easier to terminate a pregnancy in cases of fetal
impairment, such as the British law.14 4 However, it is clear from the remain-
ing parts of the Joint Statement that he Committees are not recommending
law reform in the direction that was proposed by the Spanish government.
Rather, the two treaty-monitoring bodies are proposing full decriminaliza-
tion of abortion and allowing each woman to make her own, very personal,
decision on whether to carry a pregnancy to term.
When the Joint Statement was issued, the Chairperson of the Comnittee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities made the following comment: "I
am very concerned that opponents of reproductive rights and autonomy often
actively and deliberately refer to disability rights in an effort to restrict or
prohibit women's access to safe abortion . .. This constitutes a misinterpre-
tation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities."1 45 This
comment and the Joint Statement of the two Committees are timely because
certain organizations have previously cited the CRPD as support for crimi-
nalizing abortion.14 6 If the Supreme Court eventually agrees to review a stat-
ute that prohibits abortion when sought for particular reasons then we can
certainly expect the discourse of equality, eugenics, and isability rights to
be argued even more strenuously before the Court. But one hopes that the
women's movement and the disability rights movement can find ways to
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